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WHAT DOES LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TELL US?
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK*
Legislative history is out of the doldrums. For decades judges
pawed through legislative history without much theory about what they
were doing or why. Judges were atheoretic, the rest of the bar largely
apathetic. How times have changed! Discussions of the role of legisla-
tive history, of statutory interpretation in general, have erupted both on
the bench and in the academy. For the first time in 50 years there is a
sustained, interesting debate about how to understand statutes, the meat
of the business in federal courts. Debate ranges over questions of polit-
ical philosophy, political economy, and epistemology-as it must when
the question is "what counts as law in our constitutional republic, and
how do we identify that law?"
Professor Eskridge is one of the principal contributors to the new
learning about statutes. His contribution to this symposium is part of his
effort to reexamine and reconstruct the foundations of statutory interpre-
tation. It is an enterprise well worth doing, and one he has been doing
well. Although, as his essay makes clear, his conclusions are not congru-
ent with mine, we have much common ground, especially the rejection of
the beliefs that subjective intent of legislators (a) can be found, and (b)
represents "the law" if found. Both of us, like most other contemporary
students of this subject, have been persuaded by work in public choice
that it is misleading to speak of "the legislature" as an entity with a mind
or purpose or intent, and wrong to assume that the compromises neces-
sary to enact laws are uniformly public-spirited.
People of good will disagree about where the common weal lies. An
assumption that legislation points toward it is not so much a rule of in-
terpretation as it is wishful thinking coupled with a hope that judges can
pick up the torch. Realistic understanding of statutes treats them as
compromises. Still, it may be possible to nudge the outcome a little in
the direction of goodness. Can a gaggle of lawyers with no training in
social science and insulation (by tenure) from the pulse of America do
this? Are they authorized to do it, if they can?
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The Law
School, The University of Chicago. This essay is a comment on W. Eskridge, Legislative History
Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365 (1991), and is © 1991 by Frank H. Easterbrook. I thank Abner
S. Green and Richard A. Posner for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Professor Eskridge believes that they can and may, to a limited ex-
tent anyway.' I have argued elsewhere that they can not and may not.2 I
refrain from rehashing our differences, which are apparent from Profes-
sor Eskridge's essay, although I elaborate a little below. One apparent
difference is not nearly so great as it seems: the appropriate use of legisla-
tive history. Professor Eskridge attributes to the "New Textualists" the
view that judges are to legislative history as Catholic priests are to sex.
He then uses Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. 3 to show that absti-
nence is not the best policy, and that a judge may obtain from the legisla-
tive history material on which to base a decision, although not a
confident one.
Justice Scalia insisted in Green that the legislative history of Rule
609 was neither illuminating nor relevant. Eskridge takes this as the
paradigm of "New Textualism." Justice Scalia insists that "law" lies in
the enacted texts rather than in the legislators' intents. Yet this does not
always lead him to disregard the history of an enactment.4 Well it
should not, as Green shows. Rule 609(a)(1) says that a witness's criminal
record may be admitted when "the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial value to the
defendant" (emphasis added). Why only the effect on "the defendant"?
One possibility is that the text is a garble, and that it really means "the
litigant" or "the criminal defendant." Another is that the phrase demon-
strates a limited domain for Rule 609-that the rule applies only to crim-
inal cases (the only kind in which the Rules of Evidence generally give
special consideration to "defendants") and is inapplicable to civil cases,
1. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989). See
also Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989). Both
Eskridge and Sunstein are a good deal more modest about the court's abilities and authority than are
Guido Calabresi and Ronald Dworkin. See CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STAT-
UTES (1982); DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986).
2. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Easterbrook, Legal Inter-
pretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 87 (1984); Easterbrook, The
Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4,
14-18 (1984); Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985);
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 59
(1988); Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773 (1990); Matter of
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989); Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1490-1500 (7th
Cir. 1988) (in banc) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1317-19 (7th Cir.
1990) (in banc), affirmed, Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991); Continental Can Co. v.
Chicago Truck Drivers Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1990).
3. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
4. "I play the game like everybody else ... I'm in a system which has accepted rules and
legislative history is used .. . You read my opinions, I sin with the rest of them." JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 174-75 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988) (Justice Scalia's
comments during a panel discussion).
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making "the defendant" sensible as it stands but precluding universal
application.
Which is it? All of the Justices assumed that Rule 609 has universal
application, producing a considerable problem in interpretation and need
for triage. The majority of the Justices trudged through the legislative
history and concluded that Congress wanted convictions to be automati-
cally admissible to impeach any witness in a civil case; the dissenting
Justices used the same methods yet reached a different destination; Jus-
tice Scalia got off the bus. Professor Eskridge takes the entire tour, but
like the Court on the assumption that the legal archaeologists are looking
for missing pieces of pottery, for the best way to complete Rule 609.
Suppose we start in a different place, with the question: "What
makes us think that Rule 609 applies to civil cases?" One answer might
be that the Rules of Evidence are supposed to apply to all litigation, as
Rule 1101(b) says. But the jarring reference to "the defendant" in Rule
609(a)(1) suggests a more restricted domain. Legislative history may be
useful in showing the scope of an enactment. If we turn to the debates
(as eight Justices did) we find a pitched battle ending in a compromise.
Combatants wrangled about the treatment of criminal defendants. The
compromise was about their rights, nothing more.
Words do not have natural meanings; language is a social enterprise.
Textualists, like other users of language, want to know its context, in-
cluding assumptions shared by the speakers and the intended audience.
Words in legislation may be terms of legal art. Debates and remarks may
tell us whether the words in a statute appeal to a lay understanding or to
a technical one. Because laws themselves do not have purposes or spir-
its-only the authors are sentient-it may be essential to mine the con-
text of the utterance out of the debates, just as we learn the limits of a
holding from reading the entire opinion. When litigants appeal to a pre-
cedent, the judge's first inquiry is whether the old decision contains a rule
of decision for today's case. Many an opinion concerns the same subject
without resolving it. On learning this, the judge takes what is to be
learned from the reasoning but seeks "authority" elsewhere. Just as
cases have limited domains of authority, so with statutes, and again con-
text matters. What we learn from consulting the debates behind Rule
609 is that the statute is limited to criminal cases. Any particular mean-
ing in civil cases is fanciful-invention, not construction.5 Why invent a
meaning for Rule 609? Every statute has limits; once we discover the
5. See K. Shepsle, Congress is a "They, "not an "It"- Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, - INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. - (forthcoming 1991).
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limit of Rule 609, we may put it down and seek the answer to our prob-
lem elsewhere.
As it turns out, "elsewhere" is close at hand. Rule 403 says that
evidence, although relevant, may be excluded "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." If Rule 609
concerns only criminal cases, then Rule 403 supplies the rule for civil
cases. Courts should take the "danger of unfair prejudice" into account
as Professor Eskridge thinks proper, but without either torturing the lan-
guage or employing the judges' own systems of values. The majority
concluded that the structure of the rules was against this outcome, and
Justice Scalia agreed. 6 Yet their argument shows that the wrong ques-
tion begets an irrelevant answer. The majority asked whether "Rule 403
overrides Rule 609" and answered that it does not because Rule 609 con-
tains its own balancing test: the specific controls the general. Indisputa-
ble, if Rule 609 applies to civil cases. Asking whether Rule 403 "over-
rides" Rule 609 begs the answer to that question.
No degree of skepticism concerning the value of legislative history
allows us to escape its use. Especially not when we know that laws have
no "spirit," that they are complex compromises with limits and often
with conflicting provisions, the proponents of which have discordant un-
derstandings. Legislative history shows the extent of agreement. It is
inconsistent with the approach Professor Eskridge generally accepts to
assume that a law covers whatever subject comes before the court and is
in need of interpretation; proper use of legislative history includes learn-
ing whether the agreement reaches so far. 7
What else ought courts do with legislative history? Doubts about
the value of legislative history arise not because the context of a law is
unimportant, but because snippets from the debates so often have been
used in lieu of the text, or as an excuse to nudge the law closer to the
view of the losers in the legislative battle (a class that may include the
judge). The text of the statute-and not the intent of those who voted for
or signed it-is the law. To discard an intentionalist view of statutory
meaning is to limit dramatically the use of legislative history.
We may no longer plumb the history to discover where the sponsors
wanted to go; compromises place limits on how far they were able to
proceed in that direction.8 We may no longer assume that anticipated
6. 490 U.S. at 525-26 (majority), 529 (Scalia, J.).
7. United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 517-23 (7th Cir. 1988), provides an illustration of
the method.
8. "[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or
will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative
[Vol. 66:441
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effects dictate the meaning of rules. Statutes commonly contain means,
rules of conduct, while legislative history describes what the drafters in-
tended these rules to achieve. But only the rules are enacted, not all
predictions come true, and some unexpected things are bound to hap-
pen.9 Laws therefore have effects not recognized in the committee re-
ports. In the main, shared meaning in the legislative process is limited to
the rules to be established; expectations about what these rules will do
diverge much more widely. (Sometimes Congress enacts objectives, as in
the antitrust laws when instructing the courts to prevent "monopoly";
these laws properly receive interpretation quite distinct from those that
prescribe means rather than ends.)
Because the text is the law, we may not properly use colloquy to
engage in "imaginative reconstruction."' 10 What distinguishes laws from
the results of opinion polls conducted among legislators is that the laws
survived a difficult set of procedural hurdles and either passed by a two-
thirds vote or obtained the President's signature. Even the most astute
inductions about what Congress "would have done" if faced with a prob-
lem are just paths not taken.
Consider the difference between interpreting a statute and interpret-
ing a contract. Contracts, like laws, may have omissions and ambigui-
ties. It is standard practice to fill in the blanks of a contract, or interpret
its ambiguities, by supplying terms that we believe the parties would have
reached themselves if costs of bargaining were low. This is imaginative
reconstruction in practice. It works because contracting parties gener-
ally have a single objective (making money), implying a standard by
which to write or disambiguate terms. The institution of contract be-
choice -and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that
whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law." Rodriguez v. United States, 480
U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2668, 2676 (1990).
See also Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986); Matter of Erickson,
815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
9. "It is not the law that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its
legislative history." Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2683, 2688 n.2 (1990). See also Zabielski v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
919 F.2d 1276, 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218, 226 (7th Cir. 1990) (in
banc); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Cont. Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 364-65 (7th Cir.
1987).
10. "Petitioners ...insist that if Congress had considered the issue, it would have granted
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil RICO cases. The argument.., is misplaced, for even
if we could reliably discern what Congress' intent might have been had it considered the question, we
are not at liberty to so speculate". Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1990). A more recent
opinion says that imaginative reconstruction "profoundly mistakes our role" and characterizes the
process as "a usurpation." West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1148(1991). See also Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1499-1500 (7th Cir. 1988) (in banc)(Easterbrook, J., dissenting); United States v. Phelps, 895 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing in banc).
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comes more useful when courts relieve parties of the need to dicker over
everything in advance (or receive unexpected jolts if they do not). Every-
one gains, at least ex ante, when the legal rules allow parties to conserve
on bargaining costs. Legislators do not have common objectives, so the
basis for imputing agreement to them is weaker than the foundation for
this technique in private law. More important, the constitutional rules
are designed to increase, not minimize, the "costs" of enacting statutes.
The complex of hurdles, in the context of the limited time each legisla-
ture has to act, is an essential part of the plan. So a method of interpreta-
tion appropriate to contracts is inappropriate to legislation, and with it
goes one use of history. Legislative history has become less important
because there is less to use it for.
Professor Eskridge believes that one appropriate use of history is "to
correct apparently erroneous directives from the principal" by imagining
what the principal would have wanted. " He has good company, includ-
ing Judge Posner, in this. 12 Both, together with many other thoughtful
persons, including Learned Hand, 13 derive this error-correction model
from an analogy to private agents. Judge Posner urges us to treat an
unclear (or mistaken) law as a garbled command to a secretary ("cancel
today's lunch date with X," when the calendar shows that the date is
with Y), or to a platoon leader ("Go [static]."). Everyone can tell that
action is essential, but what action? The secretary or platoon leader had
best make a quick choice, and in neither case is literal compliance appro-
priate. Eskridge analogizes a law to a mother's instructions to a nanny,
who may have to make alterations in order to do the best for the
children.
I agree with Eskridge and Posner that a good secretary, nanny, or
sergeant avoids empty-headed literalism. We hire agents for their exper-
tise and judgment as well as for their ability to follow orders; good agents
know when to deviate from a command in order to achieve more of the
principal's objective. Still, it does not follow that courts ought to treat
legislation the way nannies treat recipes for soup. Examples concerning
secretaries, soldiers, and the like have several things in common: they
posit a single living principal, a single agent, and a single maxim. None
of these holds true when the time comes to interpret statutes.
Statutes are drafted by multiple persons, often with conflicting
11. Eskridge, Legislative History Values, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 365 (1990). See also Eskridge,
Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 327-30 (1989).
12. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 267-78 (1990).
13. How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in The Spirit of Liberty 106, 108-09 (I.
Dilliard 2d ed. 1954). Judge Posner traces the method to Aristotle. Supra note 12, at 103-04 n.3.
[Vol. 66:441
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objectives. There will not be a single objective, and discretionary inter-
pretation favors some members of the winning coalition over others.
(Maybe it favors the losers!) An agent's hands are more closely tied
when the principal names a means without having a clear objective.
Moreover, the parallel to a private agent such as the nanny supposes an
ongoing relationship, one in which discretion by the agent best serves the
principal's current objectives. With legislation, the "principal" is not the
sitting Congress but the enacting one (or perhaps the polity as a whole).
This brings into play the many rules that tie the hands of those princi-
pals-and perforce of their agents, as it is difficult to give a constitutional
theory that endows the judiciary with greater legislative discretion than
Congress possesses. Legislators cannot create laws without satisfying
constitutional requirements (bicameral approval and the like), plus inter-
nal requirements (consideration by committees, and so on). The drafters
go out of office and lose the ability to update their decisions; the current
legislature may update or be passive (and passivity may stem from still
more procedural obstacles rather than agreement with the rules in place).
Still more differences separate the legislature-judge relationship
from the common principal-agent one. Laws are designed to control the
conduct of strangers to the transactions, not just of the judges. Rules
must be publicized to be effective (to be "rules of law" at all). Address-
ees need predictability so they may plan for compliance, for the rear-
rangement of the rest of their lives. Usually the addressees (the platoon
commanders or nannies) are not judges. They are businesses or the exec-
utive branch of government. They may be hostile to the constraints;
their purposes diverge from the legislators' objectives. If they do not
obey, they are not fired (as private agents may be); instead they are
brought to court. If addressees must be able to vary the commands in
order to fulfil their objectives, then undermining is likely too. What role
is left for judges? To descend from the hills and shoot the wounded?
Judges too may be hostile to the commands, or may believe that the sup-
porters did not do "enough." Private agents acting on these views would
be discharged; judges have tenure.
My point is simple: an understanding of agency appropriate to one-
on-one transactions is not appropriate to the business of writing and im-
plementing statutes. To the extent it is a useful analogy, it shows why
the laws' addressees-private persons or the executive branch-should
have discretion in interpretation. It may show, for example, why courts
defer to administrative agencies' interpretation of the law, and why pub-
1990]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
lic officials have immunity from liability in damages. 14 So used, however,
this analogy diminishes the role of the courts in governance, and of legis-
lative history in judging.
So far I have identified only one proper use of legislative history:
establishing the domain of the statute. Putting a law in context is not the
exclusive use of legislative history. The model of the United Kingdom
and many European nations, which disdain legislative history, is not
open to courts of the United States because of differences in the way laws
are drafted. In England the Office of Parliamentary Counsel drafts the
government's bills; 15 in France the Conseil d'Etat reviews the govern-
ment's projet d'loi. Most other nations have similar institutions, which
embody legal society's wisdom about good drafting. They do more than
dot i's and cross references. They catch and remove ambiguities; they
revise laws so that they will achieve anticipated results after the applica-
tion of the canons of construction; they comb the books for inconsistent
rules to be amended or removed; they add statutes of limitation and spe-
cify the extent of private rights of action. Parliamentary systems give the
government control over the content of law, the leisure to get things right
before introducing bills, and confidence that the proposed text will be
enacted as is. Legislative history may be disregarded in these nations (a)
because these other mechanisms take care of most of the problems for
which we use legislative history, and (b) the parliaments do not draft
laws at all, but knuckle under to the cabinet's wishes (or bring down the
government). It would overstate the role of a parliament to put much
weight on speeches for or about the government's legislation.
Congress, unlike a parliament, really "makes" the law-usually
from scratch. Thoughts of the authors matter (and sometimes the legis-
lative history really does speak for the authors). Bills are drafted by jun-
ior staffs of legislators, abused by amendments from multiple and
conflicting sources, and often hammered into shape at the very end of the
session, with little time for review. This process puts great pressure on
the ability of words to carry meaning-often a meaning all participants
shared, but which a drafter could not make idiot proof. Intelligent, mod-
est use of the background of American laws can do much to bring the
execution into line with the plan.
Provided we avoid romanticism about what we read, avoid a belief
that all participants were striving for the same goals, avoid a belief that
14. A point Posner recognizes, POSNER, supra note 12, at 271 n.14.
15. See Atiyah, Judicial-Legislative Relations in England, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS, supra
note 4, at 155-61.
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the results must be consistent and in line with "sound" policy (meaning
the judge's views of policy). We may not use legislative history to
wrench a statute from its moorings, to shift the level of generality. Laws
may be precise but expectations (values) about effects nebulous and con-
flicting. Emphasizing these "values" enables the reader to shift levels of
generality, a tactic that lets the interpreter move pretty much at will. A
case from last term shows how this works.16 Maryland allowed children
to testify in criminal trials by closed circuit television. That way the
child would never need to look the accused child-abuser in the eye. Five
Justices concluded that this satisfied the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment. The Court asked: "Why do we have confrontation?", to
which it answered, roughly, "So that defendants may receive fair trials."
Then it asked: "Did this defendant get a fair trial?", to which it answered
"Yes." That was that.
Confrontation vanished in the shuffle. The real Constitution does
not say "All trials must be fair." It contains a series of rules, which the
drafters anticipated would produce fair trials. Shifting the level of gener-
ality--emphasizing the anticipated effects of a rule while slighting the
rule itself-is a method of liberating judges from rules. When rules van-
ish, so does the claim of judges to have the final word. 17 Yet often the
point of employing legislative history is to find something on a plane of
generality different from the statute, to facilitate this maneuver. It is a
use that must be resisted not only if we wish to carry out the enacted
rule, but also if we wish to have laws that produce replicable decisions.
A corps of judges allowed to play with the level of generality will move
every which way, defeating the objective of justice (equal treatment)
under law. ' 8
Enough. This is a comment, not a screed. A few notes bring this to
a close.
1. The objective of statutory interpretation is to give the text a
meaning appropriate to our particular constitutional republic. It is a re-
public with institutions (federalism, bicameralism, a president with veto
power) that distinguish it from the democracies of Europe. A method of
interpretation based on hermeneutics slights the differences between law
and literature, and between a parliamentary system and our federal re-
public. Literary interpretation liberates the reader; novelty is rewarding
16. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
17. What's So Special About Judges?, supra note 2; Easterbrook, Approaches to Judicial Review,
in THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: AN ENDURING CONSTITUTION IN A CHANGING WORLD 147 (J.
David & R. McKay eds. 1989).
18. See Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
19901
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and rewarded. Laws do not liberate their addressees, and novelty is pe-
nalized. Creative scholars get tenure; creative subjects of legal regulation
get fined. No one supposes that the same method of interpretation is
right for Shakespeare and laws in the United States, China, Iraq, and
Germany. ' 9
2. Many scholars disagree with the analysis I have ventured here
and elsewhere. Controversy goes with the territory. Justices of the
Supreme Court regularly disagree with each other's methods as well as
their conclusions. Professor Eskridge occasionally lapses into the fallacy
that what is controversial must be wrong. He states a point, remarks
that it depends on controversial premises, and moves on, as if the point
had been demolished. 20 Not so fast! Hotly disputed statements may be
correct. At all events, the proponent of a method of interpretation that
depends on Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics 21 ought not equate
controversy with error. What would be the implication of that equiva-
lence for Professor Eskridge's work?
3. Textualism and distrust of legislative history may be confused
with conservative politics. Overlap ought to be coincidental, however. If
the textualist is interpreting laws written in a more conservative era, the
results will appear "conservative" to modem eyes. Sometimes, however,
the change goes the other way. The "conservatives" in the confrontation
clause case used the Warren Court's usual kit of tools to get 'round an
inconvenient text, and the textualist (Justice Scalia) stumped for the re-
sult favorable to the criminal defendant. When the text is to the left of
today's consensus, textualism produces results that are politically
"liberal."
When Congress is to the left of the president, yielding a bench that
is "conservative" from Congress' perspective, everyone should support
textualism. It allows the legislature to achieve its objectives. In years
past a resort to legislative history, and a boost in the level of generality,
has been used by a bench to move the law and the Constitution to the
left. Conservatives cried out in dismay, objecting to method as well as
result. Textualism as a method is politically neutral, preserving the com-
promises of the enacting legislature. Neutrality is an objective any bench
ought to strive for-and the more power the interpreter possesses, the
more assiduously the interpreter should seek neutrality.
19. See Easterbrook, note 17 supra, and, e.g., POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDER-
STOOD RELATION ch. 5 (1988).
20. See, e.g., Eskridge, Legislative History Values, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 412-14, 428-29 (1990).
21. See Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990).
[Vol. 66:441
